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ABSTRACT: There are philosophers who deny that causal relations actually exist in nature, arguing that they are mere-
ly a product of our perspective as beings capable of intentional actions. In this paper I briefly explain this 
thesis and consider that it needs to be complemented with a basic non-causal ontological perspective which 
can account for phenomena taken as causal; I then describe what seems to be a good candidate for such an 
ontology and finally conclude, however, that it cannot dispense with the concept of causation and that 
therefore is not the kind of ontology that anti-realism about causal relations requires. 
Keywords: causation; manipulability; agent’s perspective; Huw Price. 
RESUMEN: Hay filósofos que niegan la existencia de relaciones causales en la naturaleza argumentando que no son 
sino producto de nuestra perspectiva como seres capaces de acciones intencionales. En este artículo ex-
pongo brevemente esta tesis y sostengo que debe contar con el complemento de una ontología no causal 
básica que dé razón de los fenómenos que se consideran causales. Luego describo lo que parece ser una 
buena candidata para tal ontología y concluyo que, sin embargo, ésta no puede prescindir del concepto de 
causalidad y que, por tanto, no es el tipo de ontología que necesita la mencionada tesis antirrealista respecto 
a la causalidad. 
Palabras clave: causalidad; manipulabilidad; perspectiva del agente; Huw Price. 
1. Manipulability and causation 
There exists a strong relation between causation and intentional human action. In an 
important number of cases the cause is a means that we can manipulate to produce or 
control its effect, as when we say that watering is an indispensable factor in growing 
garden plants or that we heat a room by lighting a stove. Generally, if A is the cause of 
B, by suitably manipulating A we can obtain B or avoid it. For this reason, intentional 
human action becomes an excellent resource for detecting the causal relations be-
tween two events, for distinguishing causal relations from spurious correlations such 
as those that exist among the collateral effects of a common cause, or for discovering 
the variety of causal factors that contribute to one same effect. But what is more, our 
experience as agents beginning in our earliest years becomes a relevant factor in learn-
ing and developing our notion of causation; it even becomes a necessary condition, 
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because if we were not able to manipulate nature, but only observe it passively, we 
would lack the concept of causation altogether1. 
 It is therefore not surprising that there are different philosophical theories about 
causation based on the idea of manipulability. Among the most important ones are 
those by Collingwood (1940), Gasking (1955) and von Wright (1971). Generally, theo-
ries of this type have a markedly reductionist propensity and propose that the very 
idea of causation can be defined in terms of human intentional action. Thus, for ex-
ample, for von Wright (1971, 74): 
[…] to think of a relation between events as causal is to think of it under the aspect of (possible) 
action. It is therefore true, but at the same time a little misleading to say that if p is a (sufficient) 
cause of q, then if I could produce p I could bring about q. For that p is the cause of q, I have en-
deavored to say here, means that I could bring about q, if I could do (so that) p. 
 We can find some precedents of this reductionist conception of causation in the 
Austrian physicist Ernst Mach and in Bertrand Russell. Mach used to say that the re-
peated experience of “our voluntary movements in the world” and of “the changes 
these indirectly produce” would create in us the notion of causal relation that we then 
project onto nature and apply to relations between events. And he added that this no-
tion is cognitively irrelevant, that we apply it when we do not know the phenomena in 
question enough and it ceases to matter to us when science allows us to know them 
better (Mach 1883, 580-581). The version that Russell offers of the origin and charac-
ter of the concept of causation is not very different. On the basis of the existence of 
relatively certain natural sequences, we project onto nature the schema of our inten-
tional actions, in which a wish or purpose determines a course of action orientated 
towards a goal. And this projection consists of interpreting these sequences by high-
lighting an active element in them, the cause, which, like our intentions, has its own 
result, i.e. the effect. So the causal action or causal power that we attribute to certain 
events to produce others is no more than the reflection of the ability of our desires 
and intentions to generate events. Russell also thought that the concept of causation 
was unnecessary in fundamental physics, will disappear from all the sciences and 
should lose the importance that still it retains among philosophers (Russell 1913). 
 However, attempts to reduce or define the idea of causality in terms of intentional 
human actions have been running into two serious difficulties. In the first place, they 
are accused of being circular definitions because human action itself already entails the 
idea of causation: our actions are the causes of their results or consequences. Fur-
thermore, such definitions show themselves to be excessively anthropocentric and it 
does not seem that they can account for causal relations in which the cause is not 
within reach of our capacity of manipulation, as in the case of the causal relation be-
tween the mass of the Sun and the orbit of any of its planets (Hausman 1998, 89). 
 There are, however, other versions that grant special importance to intentional 
human actions in the analysis of causation but that lack such reductionist intentions. 
                                                      
1 Woodward says that “if we had been unable to manipulate nature—if we had been, in Michael Dum-
mett’s example, intelligent trees capable only of passive observation—then it is a reasonable conjec-
ture that we would never have developed the notion of causation […] that we presently possess” 
(Woodward 2003, 11). 
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Cartwright, for example, conceives of causal relations as “effective strategies”, none-
theless defending that their effectiveness lies in the nature of things and is independ-
ent of our intentions and actions (Cartwright 1983, essay 1). And Woodward address-
es the relevance of human actions in the concept of causation by situating them within 
the larger frame of “interventions” and thus distancing himself from an anthropocen-
tric version2. Woodward defends the view that that causal relations are objective, are 
features of the world (Woodward 2003, ch. 2), but considers that a theory of causation 
should incorporate, with its ontology, an epistemology that can facilitate the under-
standing of causal affirmations and clarify their meaning and the determination of 
their truth value. As regards this aspect he underscores the heuristic importance of 
experiences in which producing a change, intervening, in a variable X entails a change in 
a different variable Y, as when a certain medication is distributed in a sector of a pop-
ulation affected by a certain disease and it is confirmed that the majority or all of the 
medicated individuals recover, whereas the rest do not undergo a significant change 
(Woodward 2003, 94). Of course, as Woodward emphasizes, this approach to causa-
tion already presupposes the very notion of causation, because the very idea of inter-
vention is causal, and it also presupposes certain causal information in specific cases: 
when analysing the results of an intervention it is necessary to know, for example, that 
the effect in question was not the result of the interference of causes apart from the 
ones used in the intervention. But it does not follow from this that an approach like 
that of Woodward is circular because, unlike the theories of manipulability such as 
that of von Wright, it does not intend to define the concept of causation or translate 
causal expressions into non-causal ones. It is simply trying to verify, based on certain 
causal information, the existence of other possible causal relations. Furthermore, this 
approach should not be branded as anthropocentric and therefore incapable of con-
sidering causal relations in which the cause is beyond the reach of human action. Alt-
hough the above-mentioned notion of intervention intuitively refers to intentional 
human actions, such as those carried out in an experiment, not all intervention has to 
have a human origin. An intervention, in short, is any event that changes the value of 
X in a way that serves to verify whether a causal relation exists between X and Y. And 
this also takes place in what scientists call “natural experiments”. Human actions are 
events that are considered interventions, not because they are carried out by human 
beings, but “because of their causal characteristics” (Woodward 2003, 103-107; 2007). 
2. Human agency as perspective 
Huw Price, however, currently defends a much less realist version of causation. He 
considers himself a follower of manipulation theory of causation and proposes a defi-
nition of causation very similar to that by von Wright: 
[…] an event A is a cause of a distinct event B just in case bringing about the occurrence of A 
would be an effective means by which a free agent could bring about the occurrence of B. 
(Menzies and Price 1993, 187) 
                                                      
2 Woodward takes up this notion of intervention from Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (1993) and Pearl 
(2000). 
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 But his anthropocentrism goes beyond this semantic reductionism and, close to 
that of Mach and Russell, situates itself at the origin and the very nature of the con-
cept of causation, turning it into a mere product of our peculiar way of being in the 
world. He defends the view that our idea of causation does not arise in us from the 
observation of causal relations in nature, or even the temporal sequences that Hume 
speaks of, but rather of our experiences of performing certain actions in order to 
achieve certain objectives and getting it right (Price 1992, 514; Menzies and Price 
1993, 194). And Price radicalizes this dependence on the notion of causation with re-
spect to our capacity to influence nature intentionally by insisting that it is not a matter 
of our intentional actions and in general our condition as agents constituting a peculiar 
form of knowing objective causal relations in the world or having a “privileged ac-
cess” to them, but that the very concept of causation has no other reason for being 
than our experience of acting intentionally in our own environment and planning our 
actions, thus forming part of our point of view as agents (Price 1992, 517); a concept 
of causation that we project on the world representing as causal relations between 
events that in themselves are not causal. In short, for Price, causation is “a category 
that we bring to the world—a projection of the deliberative point of view” (Price 
2007, 290). He applies these ideas particularly to the main property of the causal rela-
tionship, that is, its asymmetry. According to Price, the irreversibility we attribute to 
causal relations is no more than the reflection of a limitation proper to our intentional 
actions, consisting in the fact that although we can configure the future, albeit partial-
ly, we are unable to change the past. Thus the temporal asymmetry of causation de-
finitively lies in the fact that “we the agents are asymmetrical”, a fact that is perhaps 
contingent for fundamental physics, but inevitable for us (Price 1996, 145, 167 ff). 
 To clarify the type of anthropocentrism that he discovers in the concept of causa-
tion, Price resorts to different comparisons. He compares this concept with that of 
“foreigner” (Price 2007, 250). Just as no one is foreign in oneself, but rather such a la-
bel is only attributable from the point of view of another person belonging to another 
country, no relation between events is causal in itself and can only be qualified as such 
from the point of view of a being endowed with the capacity of acting intentionally on 
his or her environment. This implies that, just as no foreigners would exist if all hu-
man beings were citizens of a global state, causal relations could not exist either in a 
world in which there were not any beings capable of intervening in nature and achiev-
ing certain ends. Price also compares causation with secondary qualities such as colour 
or taste. These qualities, as we know, are not proper or intrinsic to the things they are 
attributed to, because being red or bitter depends on the characteristics of our sensory 
apparatus. Everything that can be said about the object that we describe as red is that 
it has a disposition to seem red to us (Menzies and Price 1993, 188), but beings with a 
sensory apparatus that is different to our own may not see that colour, and of course, 
if all beings with sensory capacities disappeared from the universe, there would be no 
colours. Likewise, says Price, the cause and effect relation is not a relation that exists 
in nature independently of us, but rather the way in which we, as intentional agents, 
interpret some non-causal relations between events.   
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 Price emphasizes that with these ideas on the perspectival character of the concept 
of causation he does not intend to defend a “simple-minded anti-realism” and is 
against Russell’s claim about the eliminability of the concept of causation from science 
and philosophy (Price 2007, 253, 290). However, he notes that the link he sets up be-
tween the notion of causation and our point of view as intentional agents distances 
him from those who defend “a causal structure of the world” independent of human 
beings or even a “physical asymmetry in the world”, so that his “sophisticated subjec-
tivism” destroys the metaphysical pretensions of realist theories regarding causation 
such as those of Glymour, Pearl, Woodward or Cartwright, (Price 2007, 268, 285 ff; 
1996, 136). 
 In what follows I am going to discuss the theory, defended by Price and others, 
that causation is a product of our point of view as agents and that there is no causal 
relation in nature independently of human agency. However, I am not going to exam-
ine how it is affected by the aforementioned objections of circularity and anthropo-
centrism, but rather I shall try to complete it in the way I consider most suitable and 
analyse whether in this way those anti-realist conclusions with respect to causation 
have adequate justification. 
 Maintaining that a certain property or relationship R between natural events is an-
thropocentric and doesn’t exist independently of us seems to require providing an al-
ternative property or relationship R’ more basic and objective than R that helps ex-
plain how the notion of R arises in us and how we use it coherently. So when Price re-
fers to secondary qualities as an example of anthropocentric properties, he is suppos-
ing that, for colour, there is a colourless reality (electromagnetic waves) which arouses 
in us colours and governs our application of them to things; and the same goes for the 
other secondary qualities. Therefore, a thesis on the perspectival character of causa-
tion such as those of Price and others inevitably raises the issue of what kind of non-
causal reality suggests to us the notion of causation and allows the correct application 
of causal concepts and descriptions. There are a few references in this respect in 
Price’s writings, but they are clearly insufficient. Thus, for example, in response to the 
above-mentioned objection that those who define causation exclusively in terms of 
manipulability cannot admit relations in cases in which human action is impossible, 
Price refers to the existence of some “intrinsic features of the situation involved”. 
These features would be “essentially non-causal” and allow relations of analogy to be 
established with cases in which human action is possible (Menzies and Price 1993, 
197). And he even says that thinking of causal concepts as perspectival involves as-
suming a non-causal world, to which we apply these concepts. It would be a bare 
Humean world to which, however, science allows us some access (Price 2007, 289-
290). But he does not specify what such non-causal features and such non-causal 
world could be. Below I am going to outline a possible ontology of this type and ana-
lyse to what extent this ontology is really non-causal and can constitute a good basis 
for anti-realist conclusions such as those of Price.  
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3. Seeking a non-causal point of view 
But before going into the details of what could be such a non-causal ontology, let us 
clarify something about the very concept of causation. Without intending to go into 
the thorny issue of defining the causal relation, I think it is necessary for what follows 
to insist on what I consider to be one of its distinctive traits. It is not difficult to agree 
that the relation of efficient causation is an irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive type 
of relation. In the strict sense, irreflexiveness maintains that no event is the cause of it-
self. As Hume pointed out, cause and effect are contiguous but different phenomena, 
spatially and temporally different. However, this property is usually interpreted in a 
broader way by insisting on that the cause does not occur in the system on which it 
has an effect. It is commonly understood that the cause of an event in a system is an-
other event in its environment that provokes a corresponding change in it, as when a 
rock breaks a piece of glass or the sound of an alarm makes a thief run away. Ar-
onson, for example, identifies an effect with a change that is not “natural”, but rather 
the fruit of an interference coming from outside; a natural change, in contrast, would 
be one that results from the normal course of events in the absence of external inter-
ference, that is, the absence of causes (Aronson 1971, 422). Thus one could not say 
that childhood is the cause of puberty or that the seed is the cause of the tree; the cor-
rect thing to say would be that the child turns into an adolescent or the seed turns into 
a tree. It is a matter of the old requirement of the exteriority of the cause. 
 J. L. Mackie has made one of the most detailed recent analyses of the causal rela-
tion. Although following John Stuart Mill he maintains that the distinction between 
the causal field or basic conditions and the cause strictly speaking is always contextual, 
he thinks that in our habitual use of causal concepts it is easy to find if not strict rules, 
then enough “systematic tendencies” about how we establish this distinction. Accord-
ingly, we can detect in our causal language a clear tendency to point out as cause an 
“intruder” event and not those occurring into the system in which the effect takes 
place. We would admit as the cause of a haemorrhage a cut made by a knife or a piece 
of glass, but not the pumping of blood by the heart. There is no doubt whatsoever 
that the pumping of the heart is necessary for a haemorrhage to take place, but not all 
the factors needed for an effect count as its efficient causes. For this reason, adds 
Mackie, it is not strange that the search for a cause is normally dominated by the idea 
of how that effect could or should have been avoided and that, in short, our concept 
of causation emerges from our experience as intentional agents in the world (Mackie 
1980, 31-57). It is not forcing the issue to interpret these considerations of Mackie as a 
reinforcement of the idea that, in our causal language, the cause normally coincides 
with a factor that is external to the system in which the effect occurs: an event in its 
environment. This requirement of the exteriority of the cause, which has a long tradi-
tion in the philosophy on this topic3, will be fundamental to what follows. 
                                                      
3 Special attention is paid to the exteriority of causes both in Bunge (1959, ch. 7), who echoes this de-
mand of efficient causation in Aristotle and Scholasticism, and in Pearl (2000, 165-171), who presents 
a more formal version of the notion of causation. Salmon (1993), among others, calls phenomena 
such as the propagation of a light signal “causal processes”, but without abandoning this idea of the 
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 Having made these clarifications on the notion of efficient cause, let us go now to 
the issue of a non-causal ontology which can support the anti-realist claims about cau-
sation we have seen. I think that we can find in Mach the starting point of an ontology 
of this kind. I shall develop his suggestions and analyse whether the end result is really 
a non-causal point of view. Emphasizing his idea that causal descriptions tend to dis-
appear when we get to know the phenomena well, Mach wrote:  
Heat is said to be the cause of the tension of the steam; but when the phenomenon becomes fa-
miliar we think of the steam at once with the tension proper of its temperature. Acid is said to be 
the cause of the reddening of tincture of litmus; but later we think of the reddening as a property 
of the acid. (Mach 1983, 580) 
 Thus, even though one can say that heating a mass of gas causes an increase in its 
pressure and/or volume, for anyone who knows the law of ideal gases this causal de-
scription is unnecessary, because what this law affirms is the peculiar way in which 
volume, temperature and pressure come into play in gases. It is not a causal law, but a 
law that affirms the coexistence of certain properties or, better said, the correspond-
ence between the values of certain variables in the system. In Mach’s opinion, the 
knowledge that science brings us consists of discovering the laws of coexistence or as-
sociation of properties where, transported by our tendency to project the intentional 
action-result schema onto nature, we had assumed an asymmetrical relation of cause 
and effect. I believe it would not be forcing things too much to apply these considera-
tions of Mach to many other laws, if not to all. In the case of the Newtonian laws of 
movement, although we say that the force exerted on a body is the cause of its move-
ment, what happens is that when faced with an external influence, the body reacts by 
coordinating its dynamic state with its mass; and what the principle of inertia states 
would be simply the system’s tendency to maintain this coordination. The principle of 
entropy, for its part, would describe, among other phenomena, the way in which a sys-
tem initiates a characteristic process that leads to thermal equilibrium among its parts 
when a change in temperature among them has been produced from the outside4.  
 This conception by Mach seems to provide us with a basis for outlining a general 
view of the changes in a system in which these would be no longer viewed properly as 
“effects”, that is, products of the action of a factor that is external to that system, but 
rather would be considered the states resulting from processes that take place inside 
the system and that respond to its nature. And in this aspect there are notable differ-
ences between this point of view and the causal one. First of all, they are different in 
                                                                                                                                         
exteriority of the cause. For him a light signal is a causal process not because it constitutes a series of 
causes and effects, but because by interacting with another process it is able to change it (for exam-
ple, by increasing its energy) and to register the interaction (for example, by changing its trajectory or 
colour). There are, however, theories of causation that do not include the exteriority of causes, for 
example, that of Mumford and Anjum (2011). But, as I shall defend in session 4, the kind of process 
this theory contemplates does not properly match the concept of efficient causation. 
4 We can also find this idea in Russell, for whom the importance philosophers generally attach to causa-
tion is because they are not familiar with the idea of mathematical function, which represents 
a non- causal dependence between values and is the goal of most developed sciences (Rus-
sell 1913). 
 
Sebastián ÁLVAREZ TOLEDO 
Theoria 79 (2014): 133-147 
140 
terms of their cognitive interest. The causal point of view, which correlates the action 
of an external factor on the system with a change that takes place in that system, re-
sponds basically to the “black box” schema, whereas this other approach, in which the 
most important thing is to decipher the complex processes with which the system re-
acts to the modifications taking place around it, reproduces the schema of the “trans-
lucent box”. As an example we can take the movement of a sunflower over a day. The 
causal description would point to the attraction of the light stimulus of the sun and its 
varying relative position as the cause of this movement, relegating to the background 
the complex and biologically more significant activity of the hormones responsible for 
the phototropism of the plant, through which it adapts to the turning of the earth so 
that the rays of the sun keep falling on its petals. In general, this internal process that 
ends in an “effect” is cognitively more interesting than the external event that served 
as a trigger. It can be said, in the sense of the previous quote from Mach, that in sci-
ence, the how is more important that the why.  
 Furthermore, there are also important differences between the causal point of view 
and the other approach that I am outlining here as regards their ontological nature in 
the identification of the factors responsible for the occurrence of the phenomenon in 
question, that is, concerning the assigning of an active or a passive role to the ele-
ments involved in the production of the effect. The causal point of view locates the 
activity, the productivity, in the efficient cause: for example, it is the action of the poi-
son in an animal’s organism that produces its death. However, in the second ap-
proach, the activity moves to the system in which the effect takes place: using the 
same example, the death of the animal is due to a complicated process that its organ-
ism initiates in reaction to the presence of a poison in it. It is true that there are cases 
in which the contribution or the activity of the system in which the effect occurs is so 
simple that we instinctively locate the responsibility, the action, in an external agent, as 
when we say that one ball hitting another causes the latter to move. But in general, 
and above all outside the context of simple mechanical phenomena, the importance of 
the activity of the system in which the effect takes place is significantly greater. The 
movements of the roots of a tree towards the damper areas of its environment com-
prises a much more complex and interesting activity from any point of view than the 
supposed attraction these areas exert on the tree. 
 Highlighting its strong similarities with Aristotle’s ideas on intrinsic or structural 
causes will help us to understand this point of view I have been describing. As we 
know, in his Physics Aristotle distinguished four types of causes: efficient, material, 
formal and final. Efficient causes are what we normally call causes without more ado, 
and, as we have seen, they consist of changes in the environment of a system: they ful-
fil the requirement of externality of the cause mentioned earlier. In contrast, material 
and formal causes, whose significance is related to the hylomorphic doctrine, are lo-
cated within the systems themselves. They are intrinsic causes that refer to the com-
position and structure of systems, that is, they constitute their very nature and gener-
ate their characteristic behaviour, thus their explanatory value. As Mackie (1980) re-
minded us, the selection of the explanatory factors of a phenomenon is always contex-
tual, and it could well happen that in certain situations it is more informative to appeal 
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to intrinsic factors than efficient causes, as when we say that the longevity of a certain 
building is due to its solid foundations, the quality of its materials, the proportions 
among its dimensions, and so on. This is a causal explanation, but in the broad sense, 
that is, appealing to structural causes, not in terms of efficient causation. For all of 
these reasons it is not an exaggeration to consider that the ontological point of view 
that I am outlining here has a notable Aristotelian flavour insomuch as it vindicates 
the metaphysical, cognitive and explanatory importance of the structural and func-
tional factors of systems themselves; a vindication that serves as a convenient coun-
terbalance to the long domination of efficient causation, possibly strengthened by the 
traditional influence of mechanicism in physics and the supposed supremacy of phys-
ics in science. 
 Also of help in understanding the approach that I have been sketching out is to 
present internal activity, the reactive capacity of systems, as the result of a “homeostat-
ic mechanism”, taking this concept from R. Boyd. In several papers devoted to the 
concept of natural kind, Boyd proposes a criterion that is far removed from both the 
essentialist definitions and the constructivist conceptions as regards this topic: he con-
ceives of a natural kind as a “homeostatic cluster of properties”. The members of a 
natural kind not only share a set of characteristic properties, but also a “homeostatic 
mechanism” that regulates the values of these and guarantees a certain equilibrium. 
Homeostatic processes in biology regulate the interaction of organisms with their en-
vironment; they are the responses to external changes that provide living beings with 
an independence from their environment that is fundamental for their survival. But 
Boyd characterizes not only biological species as homeostatic clusters of properties, 
but also metals. Metals, besides sharing a certain set of properties (thermal and electri-
cal conductivity, ductility, malleability, etc.) also have in common certain homeostatic 
correlations among the values of some of them (conductivity and temperature, for ex-
ample) (Boyd 1999, 83-84). While it is true that, regarding the nature of such process-
es, he maintains that it is a matter of causal connections, that is, that the changes in the 
values of some properties would cause changes in other properties of the cluster char-
acteristic of the natural kind, if we look at the context of this affirmation it seems that 
what Boyd wanted to make clear was that the homeostatic interdependence of proper-
ties in a natural kind is not merely conceptual, nor conventionally established, nor is it 
an accidental relation, but rather consists of connections of a synthetic nature and en-
dowed with a certain natural necessity, capable of permitting inductive inferences and 
predictions and of offering  explanations of the changes (Boyd 1991, 141-143; 1999, 
83). Thus, what Boyd is really postulating is the nomological, and not necessarily causal 
nature of the homeostatic processes in natural kinds. On the other hand, it seems 
more suitable to consider that the interactions among properties in the above-
mentioned homeostatic processes obey functional laws or laws of coexistence of 
properties and not causal laws strictly speaking. If this is so, I believe that Boyd’s    
notion of homeostatic dependence among properties is perfectly retrievable and use-
ful for expressing the internal activity with which systems in general react in the face 
of certain changes in their environment: an activity which, as we have seen, consists of 
retrieving and maintaining a particular equilibrium or co-existence among the values 
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of certain variables, which is not a result of mere chance but neither is it causal strictly 
speaking. 
 Analysing phenomena by focusing attention on the activity with which systems re-
act to modifications in their environment entails doing without such a historically and 
currently important metaphysical concept as “causal power”, associated with efficient 
cause. Indeed, consistent with what I have been saying, it is not that heat has the power 
to dilate metals but that metals have the property of responding to the changes in 
temperature in their environments, recovering their own equilibrium between their 
temperature and their volume. This elimination of causal powers would be compen-
sated by the decisive importance of the capacities or disposition of systems, inasmuch 
as these would be what explains their behaviour. Fragility, malleability, or irascibility, 
to mention some of the capacities or dispositions most usual in the philosophical liter-
ature on the topic, refer to certain ways in which the systems react to changes in their 
environment by activating certain internal processes. 
 Moreover, the ontological point of view I am presenting allows one to introduce 
an opportune unification in the meaning of the concept of disposition or capacity5, as 
important in the metaphysics of the last few decades as imprecise in their content. 
Thus, for example, Cartwright, whose realist conception of causation is based on the 
importance she attributes the natural capacities of things (Cartwright 1989, 145), is 
confusing as to the way in which capacities act. She generally conceives of them as 
properties of systems, as in the case of fragility or elasticity, whose realization or mani-
festation depends on surrounding events or conditions (Cartwright 1999, 73). Howev-
er, on many occasions she seems to identify capacity with causal power, that is, with 
the property of making changes in other systems, as when she says that aspirins have 
the capacity to alleviate a headache or that “electromagnetic forces cause motions per-
pendicular to the line of action” (Cartwright 1989, 141). In other cases the concept of 
capacity is extended to comprise both meanings, as when she states that Newton’s 
principles describe the capacities of bodies with mass to move themselves and pro-
duce movement (Cartwright 1999, 165). For Bird “a disposition adscription means 
that the object would give some characteristic manifestation in response to a certain 
kind of stimulus. The fragile vase would break if struck, the irascible man would get 
angry even if only slightly provoked, and so forth”. And thus both elasticity and mal-
leability would also be dispositions in metals just as fearfulness, loathing or hoping are 
in humans. However, and as we saw in Cartwright, at other times dispositions become 
causal powers: cows’ milk would have the disposition to nourish and to cause diar-
rhoea in persons with lactose intolerance (Bird 2007, p. 3, 19, 35). In contrast to this 
semantic ambiguity, the point of view I am expounding limits and unifies the meaning 
of the notions of disposition and capacity, identifying them with the characteristic 
forms with which systems react to changing conditions in their environment, a mean-
ing that, furthermore, is the most common one. 
                                                      
5 Although for many authors there are differences between dispositions and capacities, I believe that for 
the purposes of this article I can use them practically as synonyms.   
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 Having reached this point, let us take a brief look at how the ontology I have been 
setting out contributes its own particular response to a long lasting polemic about the 
nature of dispositions. There is debate about whether dispositions are causally relevant 
or not and whether they have some kind of explanatory usefulness or not (See, for  
example, García Encinas 2011 and Vicente 2004). From what we have seen so far, we 
would have to conclude that, first of all, dispositions or capacities lack causal relevance 
from the point of view of efficient causation because they refer to processes and 
changes that take place inside systems and not to their influence on other systems. And 
secondly, capacities or dispositions nonetheless have explanatory usefulness. In certain 
contexts they help us to understand certain events, like when we say that a person be-
came ill with flu because of her delicate state of overall health, or that a metal piece 
deformed because of the high capacity of its material to dilate. One could object that 
in such cases it is after all a matter of causal explanations, and that is true, but the 
causes referred to are structural, not efficient.  
4. But isn’t there efficient causation in internal processes?  
However, one could ask whether, despite everything, these processes internal to sys-
tems that I have been discussing are not also in turn describable in terms of efficient 
causation. Certainly an entire biological process intervenes between a snake bite and 
the death of an animal, and it can be considered as a chain of causes and effects. In 
principle, this type of causal analysis is always possible, but in a trivial way. If we have 
defined causation in terms of a system and its environment, and if what is considered 
a system, and thus its environment, is inevitably conventional, it is always possible to 
refine the description of an event based on the convenient consideration of more 
basic subsystems and their corresponding environments, permitting a causal descrip-
tion of what was previously considered a process internal to a system. In a process of 
poisoning, for example, one can focus on the changes that occur in certain organs and 
describe them causally. Thus, once the poison has passed into the bloodstream, its in-
flux into the lungs causes bronchial spasms and dyspnoea and its presence in the circu-
latory system causes brusque changes in blood pressure. But of course in the opposite 
direction we can also analyse these changes focusing this time on the intrinsic factors, 
that is, on the nature of these subsystems, these organs, and how they react to certain 
characteristics of the environment (in this case the influx of poison through the 
bloodstream), and the resulting description will not be causal. This permanent possi-
bility serves as a corrective to any thesis about an inevitable and determinant causal 
reduction of the internal processes of systems.  
 At this point it is advisable to refer to the approach of Glennan, which is very simi-
lar in appearance to the one I have been expounding here, but very different as re-
gards the most fundamental elements.  According to Glennan, a distinctive trait of the 
cause and effect relation is the existence of a mechanism between the two that con-
nects them. And he defines these types of mechanisms in general as complex systems 
that produce behaviour through the interaction of their parts. Thus, for instance, the 
turn of a key in a car starts the motor because between one event and the other there 
exists a mechanism composed of a battery, sparkplugs, pistons, and so on that realizes 
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this causal connection. Causal mechanisms could also be, for example, an articulated 
float that maintains the water level in a tank or an electrical transformer. But it is not 
just a question of physical artefacts. This concept of causal mechanism is broad 
enough to be applied to biological, psychological and social causal relations as well. 
Other mechanisms in this sense are those that transmit genetic material, and therefore 
explain Mendel’s laws or the mechanism that manages to explain the way in which 
nicotine and tar interact with the body to produce cancer cells (Glennan 1996, 50, 52; 
2002, S344, S348). These mechanisms are understood to offer a type of explanation 
that could never be offered by mere regularities or statistical correlations. Discovering 
such mechanisms is equivalent to moving from the mere behaviour of a system (what a 
system is doing) to the description of its structure and internal processes that allow us to 
know how it is doing it (Glennan 2002, S347). And Glennan maintains that his mechani-
cal conception of the causal relation could serve as a foundation to a general theory of 
causation that would overcome the limitations of Hume’s theory without having to in-
clude an additional notion of causal, logical or natural necessity (Glennan 1996, 64).  
 However, Glennan admits that this version of causation has two important limita-
tions. On the one hand it is not free from circularity because the interactions among 
the parts of these mechanisms are ruled by causal laws. The processes that are trig-
gered inside a system as a result of an action in its environment and that lead to an ef-
fect are, in short, causal chains, such that explaining a causal relation between two 
events is the same as showing causal relations on a more basic level. Hence, Glennan’s 
proposal does not really contribute much to clarifying the concept of causation, alt-
hough it is not short of a certain methodological or heuristic importance. The other 
limitation of this approach would be that it is not applicable to the fundamental laws 
of physics: laws such as the principle of gravity, Maxwell’s equations, Einstein’s equa-
tion that relates the distribution of mass with the curvature of space-time or Schrö-
dinger’s equations for quantum-mechanical systems. Laws of this kind would lack a 
causal explanation because among the phenomena that they relate there are not any 
mechanisms like the ones Glennan considers: mechanisms whose parts are “objects”. 
Actually, Maxwell’s equations, for example, can no longer be explained mechanically: 
there is nothing like a mechanical environment composed of particles (the old ether) 
whose interactions could explain the propagation of electromagnetic waves. These 
laws, according to Glennan, would represent “the gross nomological facts of our uni-
verse”, about which no explanation is possible (Glennan 1996, 52, 61; 2002, S348). 
One would imagine that, from this approach, the fundamental laws of physics, which 
causation no longer reaches, would be simply laws of association or functional laws. 
In any case, one would have to conclude that we can no longer think of the principle 
of causation as a metaphysical principle with universal validity (Glennan 1996, 67-68). 
 I agree with Glennan that, as I have already mentioned, the processes that start in-
side a system in response to changes in the environment permit a causal reading: all 
one has to do is find what he calls a mechanism, that is, a relation or chain of relation 
between different subsystems and their environments. Although, as we have seen, the-
se processes also can be read in terms of what I have been calling coordination of val-
ues of variables or homeostatic interdependence of properties. But, I do not agree 
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with him in regards to the fundamental laws of physics. I believe that such laws, just 
like others, admit a causal interpretation, even though in such cases no mechanisms 
like the ones postulated by Glennan are present. Thus, for example, it can be said that 
the Earth’s gravitational attraction keeps the planets in their orbits or that it causes 
bodies to fall on its surface. Although once again the causal interpretation is not the 
only possible, and, as I have explained, the notions of co-existence of properties, co-
ordination of values, and so on seem to provide an ontologically more basic and cog-
nitively more interesting point of view.  
 I think that it is appropriate to end this session with a brief comment on the Mum-
ford and Anjum’s version of causation that I mentioned in footnote 3. For these au-
thors causation is not a relation between spatiotemporally distinct events (as is as-
sumed in what they call “two events model”), but a single “process in which one thing 
gradually turns into another” or “one property... is replaced gradually by another”. A 
causal process occurs, for example, when sugar dissolves in water or the temperature 
of a room in which there is a stove increases, taking into account, however, that, in 
these cases, the cause is not dropping the sugar in the water or switching on the stove, 
but the system composed by the water-cum-sugar or the system composed by the 
room-cum-stove working (Mumford and Anjum 2011, ch. 5).  
 It is easy to grasp that the processes that Mumford and Anjum call causal basically 
coincide with the internal processes I have been sketching in the previous session. In-
deed, the solution of sugar in water is a process with which the sugar reacts according 
to its nature, namely its solubility. And the heating of the room is a process due to the 
capacity or disposition of air to spread the kinetic energy of its molecules until reach-
ing a homogeneous distribution, that is, thermal equilibrium.  I think, therefore, that 
these processes can only be regarded causal in a broad sense, given that they result 
from structural causes, that is, features of systems in which the effect takes place, but 
they are not causal in the sense of efficient causation, as I have been arguing. It is 
therefore not surprising that, according to Mumford and Anjum, their model of causa-
tion does not admit traits such as (a) the exteriority of cause, (b) its time priority, and 
(c) the possibility of causal channels: three traits traditionally associated with efficient 
causation. 
5. Causation re-emerges 
So far we have been seeing that a perspective focused on the internal processes of sys-
tems allows an ontology that can bypass the concept of efficient causation in many 
important respects. But, can this ontology dispense with this concept entirely? Clearly 
it cannot. It seems absurd, for example, to attempt to understand our perceptual 
knowledge of the world regardless of the causal role of objects in our observations. 
The systems I have been referring to in these pages are not isolated systems like Leib-
niz’s monads, but systems whose internal processes depend on what happens in their 
environment. The natures of systems, their dispositions and capacities, are unable to 
explain their behavior by themselves. Such dispositions and capacities are defined, as 
we have seen, by their way of responding to the changes around them. Then, 
generally, the behavior of a system, its states and changes is due largely to external 
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factors. And this dependence is causal, according to the condition of exteriority of 
efficient causes, and objective: it is not the result of an anthropocentric point of view 
or a mere projection of our condition of intentional agents. In this respect, causation 
is very different from secondary qualities, because while colours or sounds exist only if 
there are organisms endowed with a specific kind of sensory apparatus, the causal de-
pendence of systems on what happens in their environment does not need the exist-
ence of human beings. Therefore the ontology I have been outlining in these pages, 
although non-causal in many aspects, and even very interesting from the cognitive 
point of view, and, as Mach suggested, very consistent with the goals of science, does 
not provide the aforementioned necessary complement for the refusal of authors like 
Price to admit the existence of causal relations in nature independently of us, adducing 
that the concept of causation is the product of our point of view as beings capable of 
intentional actions.  
 No doubt that, as said at the beginning of this paper, there exists a strong relation 
between causation and our intentional actions. Our interests as agents are of great 
heuristic value: our need for effective strategies helps us to discover causal relations in 
nature and to distinguish between these and accidental correlations. And the experi-
ence of intentional actions seems key to the setting, learning and understanding of the 
very concept of causation.  On the other hand, and in line with what we have seen 
about the ontological signification of internal processes of systems in the output of ef-
fects, it is sensible to think that our condition as intentional actors induces us to grant 
an unjustified ontological importance to the changes in the environment of systems in 
which the effects take place, that is, to reduce causes to efficient causes, because these 
are very often events that we can provoke or control directly with our interventions, 
unlike what occurs with the processes that take place inside systems.  Perhaps this 
explains partially the relevance that the notion of “causal power” has come to acquire 
in ontology. All these anthropocentric aspects of causation indicate that the 
production of phenomena in nature is much more complex than the efficient cause-
effect relation includes; however they are not capable of becoming a solid argument 
against its objective existence. 
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